In September 2010, New York City repealed its regulation on sell-by dates of pasteurized milk products, in an eort to extend shelf life and reduce unnecessary disposal. This paper examines whether the city's new policy eectively reduces food waste and improves consumer welfare. We nd that the policy reduces purchase volume by about 10%. The partial equilibrium analysis reveals that while observed quantity declines, the actual consumption of milk increases, implying a reduction in food waste more than 10%. Furthermore, we theoretically show this welfare-improving pattern is generalizable to all types of perishable food with inelastic demand.
the policy's inuence on the equilibrium price, observed quantity, actual consumption, and food waste.
The results support the assertion by the City Board of Health that the previous 9-day rule led to unnecessary disposal of milk. The estimated eect of repealing the sell-by dates regulation is a reduction in store sales volumes by about 10% in New York City. This percentage number is conrmed by the consumer panel data, which also shows the household average purchase volume decreases by about 23 uid ounces. The partial equilibrium analysis reveals that the equilibrium price and quantity are reduced due to a downward shift of the observed demand curve. However, the unobserved actual consumption of milk is increased.
Hence the 10% change indicates a lower bound of the reduction in food waste. Furthermore, we prove that this pattern of consumer welfare improvement holds true for all inelastic demand curves.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical approach and estimation results. Section 3 conducts a partial equilibrium demand-supply analysis that oers a theoretical explanation of the empirical ndings, as well as the policy's welfare implications. Robustness checks on price endogeneity and time frame of the analysis are provided in Section 4, and the nal section concludes the paper.
Empirical Approach and Estimation

An Overview
The New York City's new policy regarding milk sell-by dates took eect in September 2010.
This section oers a quick look at the eect the policy change. We rst look at the total sales volumes at the New York City area, compared to the Hartford area of the neighboring state of Connecticut, for a year before and after the policy initiation. The three counties of New York City considered are Kings (Brooklyn), New York (Manhattan), and Queens 2 , whereas to September 2011 and the corresponding months in the previous year. For New York City, the post-policy sales volumes are more likely to be lower than pre-policy volumes of the same months from previous year. On the other hand, total sales volumes more frequently exceed the pre-policy levels in Hartford, especially in the later period.
eect with neighbor counties. To quantitatively measure of the policy impact, we run a classic two-period Dierence in Dierence (DID) regression with store xed eects (Card and Krueger, 2000) . Table 2 contains the estimates of the two-period model, which is labeled as Model A. In the second column, the dependent variable is the quantity of yearly store sales volume. It predicts the longer shelf life of milk products in New York City results a 480 gallons decrease in sales volumes per store. Because there is signicant variation in store sizes in the data, the absolute quantity may not have a meaningful interpretation for the smallest and largest stores. Hence we consider an additional specication using the logarithm of store sales 
Monthly and Quarterly Volumes
In this section, we apply the DID method to store monthly and quarterly sales volume, instead of the two-period yearly data. Since milk consumption is highly seasonal, this specication allows for the time-specic variations within a year. Figure 2 displays the region-level total monthly and quarterly volumes 3 . As it suggests, although following similar overall trend, the monthly volume is more volatile. The right panel also illustrate trends using separate linear tting lines. The two regions share similar pre-policy trends and New York City saw relative lower volumes in post-policy periods. Table 3 presents the results of DID using monthly (Model B) and quarterly sales volumes (Model C). Similar to the two-period model, we use both the volumes and their logarithms Note: All models control for time-specic xed eects.
as dependent variables. Before ocially implementing the new regulation, the City Board of Health announced the schedule of public hearing in June 2010 which was subsequently held in July. We introduce a dummy variable, Hearing, to indicate the month or quarter that includes September 2010. Additionally, year and month/quarter time-specic xed eects are controlled in all of the four specications. The estimated policy eects are in line with the two-period modelstore monthly and quarterly sales volumes decreases by 11.1% and 10.4%, respectively.
Household Purchase Volumes
The previous discussion is based on store-level data which does not have direct implication on policy impact on household purchase volumes, e.g., how much milk was consumed by a typical household, before and after policy taking eect. This is due to the lack of information on the population size that each store serves in the Retail Scanner data. Here we turn to the 
Summary of Results
A summary of the results of the ve models discussed so far are shown in Table 5 . In this section, we show why New York City's new policy is welfare improving. At a rst glance, it may seem obvious that longer shelf life would benet the consumer welfare. However, as we will prove later, this is not always the case. The result of New York City is likely due to the inelastic demand for milk products. Below, we illustrate how increasing a product's shelf life changes the equilibrium outcome including price, observed demand and actual consumption, and how these outcome variables aect food waste and consumer welfare. The analysis is carried out through a theoretical partial equilibrium framework and its application to the New York City case based on previous empirical ndings. The following discussion is based on the aggregate-level demand and supply.
Theoretical Setup
The framework starts with a specication of the consumer utility maximization problem:
where u(·) is a general utility function, q is the observed purchase quantity of milk and δ is a waste measure such that larger δ is associated with more waste. The function x(q, δ)
is a household production function that produces the actual consumption amount of milk
x. In other words, food waste is q − x. Examples of x(q, δ) include x(q, δ) = (1 − δ)q and x(q, δ) = q − δ. The price of milk is p and y is the numeraire. The budget is constrained at w. Some obvious properties of the functions u(·) and x(q, δ) are:
where x 1 and x 2 are partial derivatives of x respect to q and δ, respectively. And x 11 is the second-order partial derivative of q. Note that 0 < x 1 ≤ 1 means that an extra unit of purchase will increase the actual consumption by no more than a unit.
To complete the setup, we introduce a supply curve:
Here M C(·) represents the marginal cost of producing milk and M C (·) ≥ 0. In this paper, we assume that the supply curve is not aected by the policy change within the time frame of analysis since the marginal cost stays the same. It is possible, however, that in the long-run, changes in milk nal-product market would aect the upstream input market and consequently shift the supply curve.
Combining the rst-order condition of the utility maximization and the supply function, market equilibrium is described by the following equations:
Demand:
Supply:
The new policy in New York City leads to longer milk shelf life hence a smaller value of δ, meaning for a xed purchase quantity q, the actual consumption x increases as a result of reduced waste. In order to evaluate the welfare implication, we need to nd how the change in the waste measure δ aect equilibrium price p * and quantity q * , as well as the new actual consumption x(q * , δ). By implicit function theorem and assuming all the derivatives exist, the market equilibrium conditions above give the following relationship:
Note that the denominator of equation (1) is strictly positive. Hence the sign of ∂q * /∂δ depends on the numerator u x 2 x 1 + u x 12 only. Moreover, equation (2) shows that the price changes in the same direction as the quantity, also determined by u x 2 x 1 + u x 12 . This means, at the point of equilibrium, the direction of policy eect on price and quantity is determined solely by the demand curve. This should not be surprising as we assumed the supply curve does not respond to changes in δ. Hence, the policy is a demand shifter that moves the equilibrium point along the supply curve.
To evaluate the direction of welfare change, we need to know the changes in actual consumption x(q * , δ) and food waste q * − x(q * , δ), which requires us to consider specic functional properties of x(q, δ). Here, two examples of the specication and corresponding discussions are provided:
Proportional waste:
Proportional and Fixed-amount Waste
The case of proportional waste is the most common in studies that measure food waste (Bellemare et al., 2017; Buzby et al., 2009,1; Muth et al., 2011; Yu and Jaenicke, 2018) .
It shows an intuitive percentage waste for an easy interpretation. Mathematically, when
x(q, δ) = (1−δ)q, the denominator in equation (1) becomes −(1−δ)q * u −u . Hence ∂q * /∂δ
Note that the price elasticity of demand at the equilibrium point can be expressed as:
using implicit function theorem on rst-order condition of utility maximization. Therefore the direction of policy impact on observed quantity and price is completely described by price elasticity of demand at the equilibrium point:
As for the actual consumption x(q * , δ), the implication on inelastic and unit elastic demand is straightforward to see through the rst order condition p * /(1 − δ) = u (x * ). When δ decreases (longer shelf life), the left hand side strictly decreases. Hence x * must increase because of concavity of u(·). As a result, food waste q * − x * decreases. In these two cases, the New York City's new policy would increase actual consumption of milk while households spend less expenditure on milk, which is clearly welfare improving.
p q
Observed Demand Actual Consumption In the case of elastic demand, although longer shelf life would raise equilibrium price and quantity, the welfare implication is not conclusive. On the one hand, because welfare is strictly improved when η * D = −1, there must be a range of elasticity close to −1 where there is still improvement. On the other hand, if demand is very elastic while supply is inelastic, then the new equilibrium price could be so high such that the increase in actual consumption does not compensate the rise of expenditure. In some extreme cases it is even possible that the actual consumption would also fall. These scenarios can be easily seen using a graphic plot of demand and supply curves. The ambiguous implication of elastic demand is related to more premium types such as organic food. It is therefore important to make careful examinations on the eect of sell-by dates on these types of food.
Finally, we turn to the xed-amount waste measure. When x(q, δ) = q − δ, then the denominator in equation (1) is now −u , a positive number. Hence the change of equilibrium quantity and price under xed-amount waste is identical to the one of inelastic demand of proportional waste. And the change in actual consumption can be seen from rst-order condition p * = u (x * ): when δ decreases, price p * decreases and actual consumption x * increases. In sum, when facing a longer shelf life, xed-amount waste is always welfare improving, regardless of demand elasticity.
The following is a summary of the partial equilibrium analysis for the proportional and xed-amount waste, when shelf life is increased: 
New York City Policy
In this section, we position the case of New York City into the theoretical model based on previous empirical ndings. We estimate that abandoning the 9-day rule decreases sales volume of milk products about 10%. Mathematically, this means ∂q * /∂δ > 0. In the partial equilibrium model, this relationship corresponds to the inelastic demand in the proportional waste specication, as well as the xed-amount waste specication. It is clear that milk demand in New York City is inelastic, as shown in Table 5 . To conclude that food waste is reduced and welfare improved, we need to check if the price drops. Again, we apply a DID model to the county-level and region-level milk monthly retail price, controlling for time-specic and location-specic xed eects. The policy leads to an estimated decrease of price for about 3%. Since reaching the new equilibrium is a movement along the supply curve, the 10% deccrease in quantity and 3% decrease in price indicate an elastic supply.
In sum, the empirical ndings are consistent with the theoretical prediction. Hence we conclude that the new policy reduces food waste and improves welfare (see Table 6 ). It is noteworthy that the 10% change in sales volumes only represents a lower bound for the reduction in food waste. Since change in waste is calculated as ∆waste = ∆q * − ∆x * where ∆q * < 0 and ∆x * > 0. We only estimate the decrease in observed quantity ∆q * ≈ −10%
while the change in actual consumption ∆x * is not calculated by the empirical models.
Therefore the actual reduction in food waste is more than 10%.
Retailer Prots
So far, we have focused on the consumer welfare. Upon the empirical ndings of New York
City and the theoretical discussion, our model suggests the retail prots would drop as a result of lower price and quantity. This is implicitly implied by our assumption that the supply curve is not aected by the policy.
However, in a longer time period, the marginal cost of selling milk products could possibly change for two reasons. First, the new equilibrium price and quantity in the retail market will transmit to the upstream input market, namely, milk farms, processors, and distributors.
When retailers experience retail price drops, their input demand for milk products will shift downwards and lower the equilibrium price in input markets. Second, a longer shelf life of milk allows more exible inventory and logistics management, which reduces the cost of storage and disposing expired products. In these cases, the long-term marginal cost is likely to be reduced. Whether the shift in supply curve results higher prot depends on the elasticity of demand function. If demand is elastic, then increasing quantity and lower price would generate more prot, and vice versa.
Robustness
Price Endogeneity
The issue of price endogeneity in this study mainly rises from the unobserved store-specic factors. First, throughout the whole time frame, individual stores may face demand shocks that are correlated with their milk prices, for example, store-wide promotions. Second, there is a particular endogeneity concern that relates to the policy itself. As we previously discussed, both the demand and price are aected by the policy. At the aggregate level, the correlation between price and the policy variable does not necessarily imply inconsistent parameter estimates. However, individual stores may respond dierently to the policy change due to unobserved factors, which could lead to biased estimates.
We apply two approaches to address the potential endogeneity issue. First, we use the region-level monthly and quarterly aggregate sales volumes to avoid individual store demand shocks.
6 The estimation results from the monthly and quarterly specications suggest the policy reduces sales volumes by 10.5% and 9.6%, respectively. This is slightly less than but
within 1% of what the store xed eect models predicts. Second, we adopt a Hausman type instrumental variable to the store xed eect model, where we use the average milk price in a store's county as an instrument for the store's price. The monthly and quarterly specication respectively yield 13.8% and 14.9% estimated impact of the policy, compared to 11% and 10.4% in the original model. The higher estimates from using the instruments suggest there might be substantial variation in how stores respond to the policy.
Extending the Time Frame
The empirical estimation so far is based on data in 12 months before and after the policy initiation. Here we extend the analysis to a 18-month period to check if the policy eect is signicant and persistent in a longer time frame. The two-period DID model now gives an estimate of policy eect at 10.3%. And the store xed eect models of monthly and quarterly sales volume suggest 12% and 11.6% changes. In addition, we also extend the time frame in the evaluation of household purchase volumes, which imply percentage decreases of 14.3% and 13.7% for the county-level and region-level specicaitons, respectively.
Overall, the restuls from the robustness checks are not distant from what a host of models in Section 2 suggest. They collectively provide clear evidence that the policy change works as a downward demand shifter.
Conclusion
This paper studies how the extended shelf life of New York City's milk products reduces food waste and improves consumer welfare. We nd that the policy reduces food waste by at least 10% and consumers now drink more milk at lower prices. The partial equilibrium analysis shows that the pattern of welfare improvement is likely to be a result of inelastic demand for milk in New York City. Overall, the ndings do not undermine the signicance of food dating practice. Instead, they emphasize the importance of keeping regulations and consumer education up-to-date.
The results provide the rst empirical verication on the inuence of sell-by dates on consumption behavior and shed light on studies of other perishable food. However, the similar policy change in other regions may not be have impact as signicant as the case of New York City because its 9-day was considered rather stringent. Second, as we show in the disussion of the proportioanl waste, it is possible that some premium food types may exhibit dierent patterns of change due to their elastic demand. In this case, extending the shelf life of premium food may not be necessarily welfare improving. Lastly, although this study focuses on consumer side, how dating labels aect the supply side in the long-term is of considerable interest. From the veiw of inventory and storage cost, it is likely to generate
